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Introduction
Fighting international corruption and bribery in the 21st century is a "con-
cern that corporations and governments must face as national boundaries
become increasingly blurred and transactions flow with little regard for the
traditional boundaries of the state."' The problem of international corrup-
tion and bribery combines fascinating issues of extraterritorial enforce-
ment of supply-side anti-corruption laws and the relationship between
globalization and corruption and the special problems presented by transi-
tional and new market economies. The extensive economic reforms made
to China's economy during the last twenty years certainly qualify it as one
in transition. Beyond that, however, China's economy presents an interest-
ing case because it juxtaposes a uniquely Chinese socialist ideology, incor-
porating the philosophies of Marx, Lenin, and Mao Zedong, against the
backdrop of a traditions-oriented culture with a belief system that differs in
many respects from Western models. Multi-disciplinary readings can con-
tribute to our understanding of the impact of globalization upon the prob-
lem of corruption in the Asian, and specifically Chinese, context. It is the
purpose of this article to bring some of these resources to bear on our
thinking of how best to analyze international corruption in China.
* Professor of Business Law, Co-Director of the Center for International Business
Education & Research (CIBER), and Member of the Center for East Asian Studies,
University of Kansas; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1972; M.I.A., Columbia University
School of International & Public Affairs, 1985.
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I. The Globalization Phenomenon
At the beginning of the 1990s, Kenichi Ohmae articulated the principles of
power and strategy in the interlinked economy that would give rise to a
"borderless world."2 A few years later he questioned "the relevance-and
effectiveness-of nation-states as meaningful aggregates in terms of which
to think about, much less manage, economic activity."3 Ohmae suggested
that "many of the core values supporting a world order based on discrete,
independent nation states-liberal democracy as practiced in the West, for
instance, and even the very notion of political sovereignty itself-have
shown themselves in serious need of redefinition or, perhaps, replace-
ment."4 What were the forces that would undermine "the building-block
concepts appropriate to a 19th-century, closed-country model of the
world"?5 Ohmae suggests four-"industry, investment, individuals and
information" -which, in good management consultant style, he dubbed the
"four T1's.'6 His McKinsey & Company colleagues, Lowell Bryan and
Diana Farrell, further argued that the global capital market would increas-
ingly dictate the actions and policies of government, as opposed to govern-
ments dictating the actions and policies of the market.7 James Davidson
and William Rees-Mogg skillfully articulated how the link between the
emergence of an information-based society and the resulting liberation of
2. See generally KENICHI OHMAE, THE BoRDERSI.sS WORLD: POWER AND STRATEGY IN
THE INTERLINKED ECONOMY (1990).
3. KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES
viii (1995).
4. Id. (emphasis in original).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See LOWELL BRYAN & DIANA FARRELL, MARKET UNBOUND: UNLEASHING GLOBAL CAP-
ITALISM 1 (1996) ("We are moving toward a world where the capital markets constrain
what governments can do-not the other way around. In this environment, government
policy is influenced in real time by whether or not it makes economic sense."). In his
analysis of recent financial crises, Barry Hager points out that:
What is new in the current global capital market is the presence of two factors:
the sheer volume of capital flows across borders and the existence of computers,
telephone lines, and the electronic networks that permit transactions to occur
instantaneously and in ways that create new challenges for those whose task it is
to monitor and regulate those transactions.
BARRY M. HAGER, LIMITING RISKS AND SHARING LossEs IN THE GLOBALIZED CAPITAL MARKET 5
(1998). Hager points out "[s]everal characteristics of these new, rapid flows of capital"
that "have real consequences for each national government attempting to cope with
them[:]"
First, these flows are inherently volatile....
Second, due to this volatility, they are also inherent threats to the ability of
national governments to manage their economies through two of the most basic
tools of monetary policy traditionally used by those governments: interest rates
and exchange rates....
Where things go wrong in the effort to manage exchange rates and external
financial obligations, the international authorities, led by the IMF, are eventu-
ally invited in for their assistance. Then the affected government generally loses
substantial control over the last of its traditional tools for management of its
own national economy: domestic fiscal policy.
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individuals would irrevocably alter the power of government.8
It did not take long, however, before significant questions about the
impact of globalization arose. As the world's economy has become increas-
ingly globalized, public anxiety and backlash against the trend has
increased. Ironically, governments of both industrial and developing
nations, which stand to lose power in the bargain, remain committed to
eliminating barriers to the world economy, while many of their citizens,
whose sovereignty will be enhanced by these trends, continue to fear the
effects of globalization on the social contract.9 Demonstrations at the
December 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial in Seattle 10
and the April 2000 World Bank and International Monetary Fund meeting
in Washington, D.C." starkly underscored the growing anxiety over
globalization. Contemporaneous surveys of U.S. citizens revealed a mixed
message. While "agree[ing] in principle that globalization is good," sur-
veyed Americans "disagree[d] with policies for carrying it out," prioritizing
concerns of "unfair competition, environmental damage, and job loss," as
well as lower wages, above the Clinton administration's aims of "boosting
exports and keeping consumer prices low."1 2 Opponents of globalization
voiced another concern at the third Group of Seventy-seven (Group of 77)
Summit Meeting, held in Cuba just prior to the World Bank/IMF spring
meeting. 13 "Dozens of presidents and prime ministers" used the meeting
as a platform to complain that "globalization of the world's economic and
information systems had done little but damage their countries."' 4 They
supported resolutions calling for a "shake-up of the world financial system
to give developing countries greater say over economic and trade policies,
Id. at 6-7.
8. See generally JAMES DALE DAVIDSON & LORD WILLIAM REEs-MOGG, THE SOVEREIGN
INDIVIDUAL: MASTERING THE TRANSITION TO THE INFORMATION AGE (1997).
9. See DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE TOO FAR? 1-6 (1997). See also FOR-
EIGN POLICY (Winter 1998-99). The cover of this influential foreign policy journal que-
ried, "Has Globalization Fizzled Out?" Id.
10. See Helene Cooper, Waves of Protests Disrupt WTO Meeting: Police Repel Demon-
strators as Seattle Mayor Sets an Overnight Curfew, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1999, at A2;
Helene Cooper, Bob Davis & Greg Hitt, Up in Smoke: WTO's Failure in Bid to Launch
Trade Talks Emboldens Protestors, WALL ST.J., Dec. 6, 1999, at Al; Helene Cooper & Bob
Davis, Finger Pointing Follows WTO Talks: As Some Negotiators Blame Clinton, They Face
Fire From Other Officials, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1999, at A2.
11. SeeJoseph Kahn, Globalization Unifies Its Many-Striped Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
2000, at A7; David E. Sanger, Global Storm: Loan Agencies Under Siege, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
16, 2000, at Al; John Kifner, Police Move Against Trade Demonstrators, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
16, 2000, at A6.
12. Aaron Bernstein, Backlash: Behind the Anxiety Over Globalization, Bus. WK.,
Apr. 24, 2000, at 40.
13. See Castro Denounces Lenders at Havana Meeting of Poor Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
13, 2000, at A17. At least 40 heads of state or government attended the Group of 77's
three-day summit meeting, at which President Fidel Castro "attacked the global capital-
ist system" as causing "suffering comparable to the Nazi Holocaust" See id. "Since its
1964 founding, the Group of 77 has grown to include 133 developing nations, represent-
ing around 80 percent of the world's population." Id.
14. Developing Nations End Meeting With a Call to Share the Wealth, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 2000, at 4A.
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for forgiveness of foreign debt and for sharply increased foreign aid."1 5
The changes proposed by the "Group of 7 wealthy nations" at the IMF "that
would discourage nations from borrowing too often from the fund and
encourage them to pay back their loans quickly" did little to satisfy the
demands of developing countries. 16
The developing countries' complaints against the WTO are aptly sum-
marized by Linda Lim, Professor of International Business at the Univer-
sity of Michigan: their main criticism is that "'the W.T.O. is a rich man's
club set according to rich man's rules which tend to disadvantage the poor
guys.' 17 Malaysia's Mahathir Mohamad has acknowledged that some
countries of the South, including Malaysia, have benefited from the liberali-
zation of trade;18 at the same time, he has identified new threats to devel-
oping and newly emerging economies:
Not only have the poor countries of the South to struggle merely to meet
the basic needs of their peoples, but they are now bullied into adjusting their
economic policies to meet their new obligations so that Northern-based cor-
porations can penetrate and capture their markets.
The poor may not reserve their markets for themselves even when they
have no capacity to penetrate the markets of the rich.
Fair competition and level playing fields are only for the rich. For exam-
ple, their attempts to link the environment and labour standards to trade in
manufactured goods is a clear attempt to deny developing countries their
meagre competitive advantage.
The relationship between trade and labour standards emerged not
because of a concern for the well-being of workers in poor countries, but as
protectionist moves aimed against growing and competitively-priced imports
from the South.
To compound this unfair interpretation of the multilateral trade rules,
when it comes to technology transfer, Northern countries take a fiercely
anti-liberal stand, insisting that all World Trade Organization member states
introduce a set of national laws to protect intellectual property.
Since most patents are owned by the North, this, in effect, means legal
protection of their technological monopoly and a drastic curtailment of the
right of developing countries to havw access to new technology. 19
Mahathir thus suggests that the methods formerly utilized by devel-
oped countries to develop are no longer available to presently-developing
countries because those methods are now believed to impose unacceptable
15. Id.
16. Joseph Kahn, Wealthy Nations Agree on Changes in I.M.F., N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 16, 2000, at A6 ("Though the move by the ministers might reduce some long-term
borrowing by I.M.F. client nations, it seems unlikely to satisfy many of the critics of the
fund's long-term loan programs."); see Jane Bussey & Ken Moritsugu, Are They Making
the Poor Poorer?, KAN. CITY STAR, Apr. 24, 2000, at 6B.
17. Barbara Crossette, Making Room for the Poor in a Global Economy, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 16, 2000, at D1. Professor Lim elaborated: "'The sectors which benefit poor coun-
tries have not been liberalized ... and those sectors are textiles-labor intensive tex-
tiles-and agriculture.'" Id.
18. See Mahathir Mohamad, Rich in Hypocrisy, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Oct. 6, 1996,
at 10.
19. Id.
Vol. 33
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costs on developed countries. Essentially, Mahathir perceives an implicit
fundamental fairness argument against this shift in standards. Indeed,
when the U.S. government imposes sanctions on Southeast Asian countries
because their labor organization values are inadequate by our standards,
one could plausibly ask, with some degree of cynicism, whether the real
driving force is genuine concern for suppressed Southeast Asian workers
or pressure from domestic union interests to exclude cheaper imported
goods.
Some argue that Mahathir's arguments go too far. One such critic,
Gregory Andrews, responded to Mahathir's editorial and pointed out two
considerations he had ignored: (1) "sound legal principles of personal free-
dom and property rights have an integral role in economic development;" 20
and (2) "sound economic policies contribute more to economic develop-
ment than either protectionism or resource exploitation."2 1 Ha-joon Chang
has demonstrated that, "[a]lthough the constraint imposed" by transna-
tional corporations (TNCs) "on national industrial policy may be growing,
it is nowhere near the point where a strategic industrial policy is impossi-
ble."22 For one thing, "despite the recent increases in their importance,
TNCs do not have unambiguously superior bargaining power in all indus-
tries in relation to all countries."23 Moreover, "there is [still] a lot of room
for maneuver for national governments."24
II. The "Asian Values" Debate
Assuming a country still has room to assert its strategic policy against the
onslaught of globalization, can a peculiarly Asian approach be articulated?
If so, does this approach necessarily carry with it uniquely "Asian val-
20. Gregory R. Andrews, Dubious, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 13, 1996, at 11 (let-
ter to the Editor) ("For instance, the principles of intellectual property which Dr.
Mahathir scorns are also one of the main forces behind the 'astonishing developments in
science and technology' which Dr. Mahathir covets. Likewise, the expectation of debt
repayment is what leads lenders to lend in the first place.").
21. Id. ("Policies which restrict the markets for foreign goods, or which use
resources in an unsustainable manner, while possibly beneficial in the short run, are
ultimately costly in the long term.").
22. Ha-joon Chang, Globalization, Transnational Corporations, and Economic Develop-
ment: Can the Developing Countries Pursue Strategic Industrial Policy in a Globalizing
World Economy?, in GLOBALIZATION AND PROGRESSrVE ECONOMIC POLICY 97, 113 (Dean
Baker, Gerald Epstein & Robert Pollin eds., 1998).
23. Id.
24. Id. In addition, the paradox of simultaneous globalization and fragmentation
has become a reality of the post-Cold War world. For Benjamin Barber's thoughtful
analysis of the conflict between the globalizing force of consumerist capitalism and the
fragmentary force of religious and tribal fundamentalism, see generally BENJAMIN BAR-
BERJIHAD VS. McWoRLD (1995). Philip Nichols has considered the impact of this duality
on the regulation of transnational bribery. See Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transna-
tional Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24 YALEJ. INT'L L. 257, 260
(1999). Others have argued that alongside globalization, tendencies persist toward the
territorialization and reterritorialization of economic life, as well as the development of
new organizing strategies by labor. See, e.g., Kevin R. Cox, Introduction to, SPACES OF
GLOBALIZATION: REASSERTING THE POWER OF THE LOCAL 1, 5 (Kevin R. Cox ed., 1997).
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ues?"25 The arguments run both ways.2 6 The event that sparked the
debate was "the signing of the Bangkok Declaration in April 1993 by a
number of East and Southeast Asian states, including China, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Singapore."2 7 The signatories embraced the notion that
"Asian states, because of uniquely Asian values and special historical cir-
cumstances, are justified in adopting an understanding of human rights
and democracy that is fundamentally different from that prevailing in the
West."28 Western criticisms, they contended, are "simply part of an
attempt by Western countries to assert political and economic hegemony
over Asia."29
Western critics countered that "there is no such thing as 'Asian val-
ues,'" suggesting that "the Asian statesmen's challenge to the idea of uni-
versal human rights is simply an excuse for their own grave violations of
human rights."30 Dismissing the notion of "Asian values" as "absurd," they
point out that "Asia is one of the most diverse regions in the world in terms
of culture, religion, ethnicity, and language."31 Whatever the outcome of
this debate, "it may not be totally misguided to speak of general differences
between Asian and Western cultural tendencies and dispositions."32 Fur-
ther, given East Asia's remarkable record of high and sustained economic
growth from 1965 into the 1990s, 3 3 attained using many of the same pol-
icy instruments used by other developing countries, it seemed plausible to
25. See, e.g., Joseph Chan, Asian Values and Human Rights: An Alternative View, in
DnIocRAcy IN EAST AsIA 28, 34 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1998). Among
the values frequently associated with the term are "respect for traditions and authority,
strong family ties, reverence for education, and the willingness to work hard." Id.
26. The debate over "Asian Values" is not a new one. See Bilahari Kausikan, The
"Asian Values" Debate: A View from Singapore, in D mocRAcy IN EAST ASIA, supra note 26,
at 17, 24. "In one form or another it has engaged intellectuals and governments in Asia
for almost two centuries, ever since their first contacts with the West." Id.
The debate has served different purposes at different times. In its current form,
the key issue is not the difference between "Asian" and "Western" values, let
alone the superiority or inferiority of any one set of values to another. It is not
even what is distinctively or characteristically Asian about any particular set of
values. Today's "Asian values" debate is basically about Asian societies' future
direction and development. These societies have achieved a certain measure of
economic success; the question now being asked.., is how to sustain develop-
ment over the long term.
Id.
27. Chan, supra note 26, at 28.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 28-29 ("[T]he so-called Asian conception of human rights is wrongheaded
and lacking in intellectual credibility.").
31. Id. at 34.
32. Id. at 35 (emphasis in original).
33. See WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONoMic GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY
1 (1993).
From 1965 to 1990 the twenty-three economies of East Asia grew faster than all
other regions of the world. Most of this achievement is attributable to seemingly
miraculous growth in just eight economies: Japan; the "Four Tigers"-Hong
Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan; China; and the three newly
industrializing economies (NIEs) of Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand.
Vol. 33
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attribute Asia's greater success to its unique constellation of beliefs, habits
or values. This inference motivated John Naisbitt to articulate "eight Asian
megatrends that are reshaping the world."34
The Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, 3 5 however, seriously
undermined any claims that Asian values were superior. A 75% drop in
Asian asset values from June 1997 to September 1998 put a serious dent in
Asians' confidence that they knew "the way."3 6 Reflecting the rush to a
revisionist view of the Asian economic miracle, William Overholt of
Banker's Trust asserted that Asian economic success had merely resulted
from "the same things that drive growth everywhere: high investment rates,
mainly though not entirely financed by high domestic saving; a rapidly
improving level of education; and the transfer of large numbers of under-
employed peasants into the modern sector."3 7 Paul Krugman's prescient
characterization of Asia's "miracle" as a "myth"38 several years before the
collapse of the region's currencies lent credence to his later observation
that Asia's economic achievement had been "no miracle, if by a miracle we
mean something inexplicable according to the usual laws of nature."39
Id.
34. See JOHN NAISBITT, MEGATRENDS ASIA: EIGHT ASIAN MEGATRENDS THAT ARE
RESHAPING OUR WORLD 16 (1996). Naisbitt examined eight principal trends which
would effectively shape Asia into a commonwealth of nations soon to rival the West: (1)
"From Nation-States to Networks," (2) "From Traditions to Options," (3) "From Export-
Led to Consumer-Driven," (4) "From Government-Controlled to Market-Driven," (5)
"From Farms to Supercities," (6) "From Labor-Intensive to High Technology," (7) "From
Male Dominance to the Emergence of Women," and (8) "From West to East." Id. at 14-
16.
35. The Asian financial crisis was "the third major currency crisis of the 1990s,"
following the 1992-93 crisis in the European Monetary System and the 1994-95 Mexican
peso crisis. MoRIus GOLDSTEIN, THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES, CURES, AND SYSTEMIc
IMPLICATIONS 1 (1998). For other analyses of the causes and effects of the crisis, see
HAGER, supra note 7, at 22; MARCUS NOLAND Er AL., GLOBAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE
ASIAN CURRENCY DEVALUAnONS 3-5 (1998); Ramon Moreno, Did a Boom in Money and
Credit Precede East Asia's Recent Currency Crisis?, in 1 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 23
(1999); Reuven Glick, Capital Flows and Exchange Rates in the Pacific Basin, ECONOMIC
LETrER (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., S.F., Cal.), July 17, 1998; Reuven Glick & Andrew K.
Rose, How Do Currency Crises Spread?, ECONOMIC LErrE (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., S.F.,
Cal.), Aug. 28, 1998; IMF Releases Internal Review of Its Response to Crisis in Three
Affected Asian Countries, 28 IMF SURVEY (Jan. 25, 1999) at 17; Ramon Moreno, What
Caused East Asia's Financial Crisis?, ECONOMIC LETTER (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., S.F.,
Cal.), Aug. 7, 1998; Ramon Moreno, Responding to Asia's Crises, ECONOMIC LErrER (Fed.
Reserve Bank of S.F., S.F., Cal.), Nov. 6, 1998; William H. Overholt, Asia's Bubble Crisis:
No Instant Cure, NOMURA ASIA STRATEGY (Jan. 19, 1999).
36. See Theodore Friend, The Asian Miracle, the Asian Contagion & the U.S.A., FPRI
WIRE (DEC. 1998).
37. Paul Krugman, Asia's Miracle Is Alive and Well? Wrong, It Never Existed, TIME
ASIA (Sept. 29, 1997) <http://www.time.com/magazine/1997/int/970929/counter-
point.html> (restating Overholt's observation on the primacy of "meat and potato eco-
nomics" as the basis for Asian economic success). For an example of Overholt's analysis
along these lines, see his comparison of Chinese and Soviet economic performance in
WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA 29-46 (1993).
38. See Paul Krugman, The Myth of Asia's Miracle, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at
62.
39. Id. Krugman's emphasis on the primacy of basic economic principles carries
through to his analysis of the "new economy":
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There is no question that Asia's recent financial crises "ravaged the
credibility of a supposedly distinctive East Asian, or Japanese, model of
economic growth based on cooperation between conglomerates-Japan's
keiretsu, South Korea's chaebol, Indonesia's konglomerat-and astute govern-
ment officials."4° Rather, and particularly relevant to issues of corruption,
"collapsing Asian markets revealed the crony capitalism beneath the sur-
face of East Asia's 'developmental state."41 Donald Emmerson's compari-
son of the economic resilience of nine East Asian countries and the degree
of political freedom enjoyed by their populations suggests that, although
there is not a direct relationship in every case, "[o]ther things being equal,
the economies best able to withstand the present crisis may prove to have
been those with more political freedom."4 2 Presumably, transparency of
decision-making processes would go hand-in-hand with enhanced political
freedom.
It should be noted that the same evidence is compatible with other
hypotheses. For example, the fact that Northeast Asian economies tended
to fare better than those of Southeast Asia may simply be a reflection of
their distance from Thailand, where the crisis started.43 It could also
implicate "the effectiveness of sheer wealth as a defense against attacks on
a country's markets."44 Finally, a culturalist might note that:
In the view of many business and political leaders America has entered the era
of the New Economy, in which traditional limits to economic expansion are no
longer relevant. And because America has a New Economy and the rest of the
world does not, it is once more indisputably number one, and the rest of the
world must adopt its values and emulate its institutions if it wants to compete.
To anyone with a sense of history, this is all deeply worrying. If pride goeth
before a fall, the United States has one heck of a come-uppance in store.
Paul Krugman, America the Boastful, FOREIGN AFi., May-June 1998, at 33.
40. Donald K. Emmerson, Americanizing Asia?, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 1998, at 47.
41. Id.
42. Emmerson, supra note 40, at 52. Another commentator noted that recently
developed democratic institutions had helped Thailand and South Korea adjust to the
crisis in a number of ways:
First, they facilitated a smooth transfer of power from a discredited set of politi-
cians to a new group of government leaders. Second, democracy imposed mech-
anisms of participation, consultation, and bargaining, enabling policymakers to
fashion the consensus needed to undertake the necessary policy adjustments
decisively. Third, because democracy provides for institutionalized mechanisms
of "voice," the South Korean and Thai institutions obviated the need for riots,
protests, and other kinds of disruptive actions by affected groups, and, further-
more, undercut support for such behavior by other groups in society.
DANi RODRIK, THE NEw GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MAKING OPENNESS
WORK 92 (1999).
43. See Emmerson, supra note 40, at 53.
44. Id. In support of the theory that such wealth may have shielded Northeast Asian
economies from the full effects of the crisis, Emmerson observes the following:
[I]n 1996 each of the three northeast Asian economies that would turn out to be
the most resilient-Japan, Taiwan, and Hong Kong-held more foreign exchange
on reserve than any other economy [in the region]. Moreover, all the northeast
Asian populations enjoyed higher average incomes than any of the Southeast
Asians except in Singapore.
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the five most resilient places on the list-Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singa-
pore, and South Korea-were also those most indebted to China historically
or demographically, that is, by tradition or migration. So although the crisis
has buried the belief that Asian values guarantee economic success, the race
to recover from the shocks of 1997-98 could resurrect a Confucian version
of the same faith.4 5
Cross-cultural management specialists have observed that, "[a]lthough
national differences account for variations in the concepts of status, leader-
ship and organisation, there is a clearly discernible 'eastern model' which
is compatible with general Asian values."4 6  They argue that these
"[c]ultural values dominate the structure, organisation and behaviour of
eastern enterprises more than is the case in the West, in as much as deeply-
rooted religious and philosophical beliefs impose near-irresistible codes of
conduct."47
What are the elements of this Confucian faith? The Confucian model,
whether applied to corporations or civil service or governmental depart-
ments, strongly resembles family structure.
Confucianism, which took final shape in China in the twelfth century, desig-
nated family as the prototype of all social organisation. We are members of
a group, not individuals. Stability of society is based on unequal relation-
ships between people, as in a family. The hierarchies are father-son, older
brother-younger brother, male-female, ruler-subject, senior friend-junior
friend. Loyalty to the ruler, filial piety to one's father, right living, would
lead to a harmonious social order based on strict ethical rules and headed
up in a unified state, governed by men of education and superior ethical
wisdom. Virtuous behaviour, protection of the weak, moderation, calmness
and thrift were also prescribed. 48
In the corporate context, Confucian theory encourages "paternalistic atti-
tudes to employees and their dependants, top-down obligations, bottom-up
loyalty, obedience and blind faith."4 9 Networking is a natural element of
"hierarchical, family-type" companies. 50 Such organization also has a dis-
Id.
45. Id.
46. RICHARD D. LEwis, WHEN CULTURES COLLIDE: MANAGING SUCCESSFULLY ACROSS
CULTURES 81 (1996).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 82.
50. Id. at 83. The significance of overseas Chinese networks and business linkages
throughout Southeast Asia has received much attention; such organization has been
seen as providing "a competitive edge for the overseas Chinese businessmen vis-a-vis
their indigenous counterparts and hence a basis for capital accumulation and business
expansion." Farid Harianto, Business Linkages and Chinese Entrepreneurs in Southeast
Asia, in CULTURE AND ECONoMY: THE SHAPING OF CAPITALISM IN EASTERN ASIA 139
(Timothy Brook & Hy V. Luong eds., 1997). For other accounts of this phenomenon,
see generally Jamie Mackie, Business Success Among Southeast Asian Chinese: The Role of
Culture, Values, and Social Structures, in MARKET CULTURES: SOCIETY AND MOPA11TY IN THE
NEw ASIu CAPITALiSMS 129 (Robert W. Hefner ed., 1998) (considering the impact of
traditional Chinese values and culture on the growth of markets in mainland China); see
also FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 91-
92 (1995) (discussing the significance of kinship ties in Chinese culture); BUSINESS NET-
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tinct impact on task orientation:
"[Iimmediate objectives are not as dearly expressed as they would be in, for
example, an American company. Long-term considerations take priority
and the slow development of personal relationships, both internally and
with customers, often blur real aims and intent ....
Asian management, when organising activity, attaches tremendous
importance to form, symbolism and gesture. The showing of respect, in
speech and actions, is mandatory. There must be no loss of face either for
oneself or one's opponent and as far as business partners are concerned, red
carpet treatment, including lavish entertaining and gift giving, is
imperative. 51
Similar concepts carry through to negotiation and contracting. In
reflecting on his negotiation of deals in a Chinese business environment,
an experienced commentator has noted,
The Chinese contract... embodied a principle which went far beyond
the making of lasting commercial deals. It was about the importance of
compromise as a prerequisite of progress. Both sides have to concede for
both to win. It was about the need for trust and a belief in the future. Writ
large, it was about sacrifice, the willingness to forego some present good to
ward off future evil, or, more positively, it was about investment-spending
now in order to gain later ....
The Chinese contract... involves a major rethink of our cultural hab-
its .... The pursuit of self-interest has to be balanced.., by 'sympathy', a
fellow feeling for others which is... the real basis for moral behavior. Only
if we are conditioned by this 'sympathy' will we want to take any risks with
our fellow men and women, will we trust them farther than we can count
them, or want to make life better for those we never meet.5 2
III. The Case of China and Its Reforms
Many of the specific elements discussed above focus on the general impor-
tance of relationships in an Asian business environment.53 The Chinese
word for informal relationships-guanxi-can also mean "connections."54
It is not unusual in Chinese enterprises for "unofficial channels or 'connec-
tions' [to be] used to achieve organisational aims and objectives by the dis-
pensing and repayment of favours or patronage." 55 Generally speaking,
the practice of guanxi ("guanxixue")
involves the exchange of gifts, favors, and banquets; the cultivation of per-
sonal relationships and networks of mutual dependence; and the manufac-
turing of obligation and indebtedness. What informs these practices and
WORKS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 4 (Gary Hamilton ed.,
1991) (discussing the importance of Asian business networks).
51. LEWIs, supra note 46, at 83-84.
52. CHARLEs HANDY, THE EMPTY RAINCOAT: MAKING SENsE o THE FUTURE 81 (1994).
53. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
54. YUAN WANG Er A ., BUSINESS CULTURE IN CHINA 75 (1998).
55. Id. ("Because of this, compared with managers of other countries, Chinese man-
agers often pay more attention to personal relationships within the work environment
than to the job at hand.").
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their native descriptions is the conception of the primacy and binding power
of personal relationships and their importance in meeting the needs and
desires of everyday life.5 6
The practice of guanxi is a timeless underlying "cultural assumption
shared by Chinese everywhere, on the mainland before and after the Com-
munist Revolution of 1949, in Taiwan, and among overseas Chinese in
Southeast Asia."57 It certainly has the capacity to further all the positive
aspects of Confucian belief systems described above, and is consistent with
the balancing of self-interest and sympathy exemplified by the Chinese
contract. It embodies the "forms of decorum that were thought to embody
sentiments of humane concern and respect for others" that are at the very
core of Confucian tradition; "the practice of civility and mutual respect"
encouraged by Confucian teaching was commonly regarded as a "humane"
and superior alternative to the enforcement of laws on "unwilling or recal-
citrant subjects."5 8
However, as often occurs, there was a gap between belief systems and
actual practice in traditional China. Clearly, "[n]o Confucian-oriented
emperor who wished to assume a moral role as an exemplar of the official-
dom and the people could afford to tolerate corruption."5 9 However, the
low official salaries paid by the central government to district magistrates
at the lowest rung of the Civil Service ladder were grossly inadequate to
cover their heavy bureaucratic and personal expenses; as a result, virtually
the entire Civil Service at the provincial level levied customary fees or
surcharges, or both.60 "Viewed from this angle, it is no exaggeration to
comment that the Chinese government functioned as a mechanism of
inbuilt corruption."6 1 This reflected a built-in tension of Confucian ideol-
ogy, which "discouraged corruption by its emphasis on the moral values of
56. See MAYFAIR MEI-HUI YANG, GIFrs, FAvORS, AND BANQUETS: THE ART OF SOCIAL
RELATIONSHIPS IN CHINA 6 (1994).
57. Id.
58. Wm. Theodore de Bary, Confucianism and Human Rights in China, in DEMOCRACY
IN EAsT ASIA, supra note 25, at 43.
59. ADm Y.C. Lui, CORRUPTION IN CHINA DURING THE EARLY CH'ING PERIOD 1644-
1660, at 1-2 (1979).
60. See id. at 2-3.
61. Id. at 4. Local constituents' recognition that such additional customary fees and
surcharges were in fact needed to maintain a functional government at the provincial
level led to these fees being regarded as "socially sanctioned." A practice evolved by
which they were actually discussed and determined by the local officials and the com-
munity leaders, and the agreed sum was usually within local financial capabilities to
pay. See id. at 6.
This socially-sanctioned but extra-legal amount would then be reported to the
immediate provincial seniors and through the hierarchal ladder to the governor-
general or the governor concerned, who, however, would not report it to the
Central Government. Thus while the Emperor still maintained his stand that
any taking of money more than the official quota was an act of corruption (but
closed his eyes to such activities, if they were not reported to him), the local
authorities regarded the collection of customary dues/surcharges as part of their
work To them, as well as to the people in general, corruption was obtaining
from the people more than the sum agreed upon by local officials and failing to
report it to the provincial headquarters. Usually this extra sum would be levied
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the human character" but "also stressed the importance of human
relationships." 62
When the success of the Communist Revolution ushered in "New
China" in 1949, a new sense of governmental rectitude and duty to the
people emerged. Doak Barnett described the leaders of the Communist
Party in those early years as "a remarkable group of men. Intellectually
tough, they have purpose and determination, are unswerving in their devo-
tion to their beliefs, and are incorruptible to a degree previously unknown
in modern China."63 By the end of the Maoist era in 1976, however, the
"Great Leap Forward" and "Cultural Revolution" had severely undermined
the integrity and legitimacy of the "massive institutional structures-party,
government, army"-Mao had created to run China.64
The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee in Decem-
ber 1978 made the strategic decision to shift the focus of work to "socialist
modernization," ushering in the reform period which has been proceeding
now for more than twenty years.65 Convinced that excessive bureaucratic
control stifled change and efficiency, Deng Xiaoping thought it necessary
to decentralize power within the state and to permit at least part of the Chi-
nese economy to develop outside the noncompetitive state sector of the econ-
omy. The latter would force the state sector itself to become more efficient
and dynamic. It would require far-reaching changes in employment prac-
tices, the legal system, property rights, social policy, the incentive system,
and so forth.66
In line with his deeply held authoritarian views concerning China,
however, Deng also felt that "even with economic reform and a [resulting]
wealthier society, China would have to be ruled solely by the [Chinese
Communist Party]." 67 The coupling of continued Communist Party pri-
macy with the evolution of a socialist market economy with Chinese char-
in an arbitrary and stealthy way to be pocketed by the corrupt persons
concerned....
The provincial senior officials (prefects, intendants, governors, governors-gen-
eral) knew the district magistrates personally and were required to evaluate their
performances regularly. If a magistrate practiced private corruption, it was not
too difficult for them to learn about it, but whether they took action to impeach
their subordinates was a big question mark. These provincial seniors might
have participated in the sharing of grafts. In this case, they tended to protect
their subordinates from being impeached by other officials.
Id. at 6-8.
62. Id. at 9.
63. A. DOAK BARNETT, COMMUNIST CHINA: THE EARLY YEARS, 1949-55, 8 (1964).
64. KENNETm LIEBERnA., GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 120
(1995).
65. See id. at 17. For astute analyses of the politics of the reforms see LIEBERTHAL,
supra note 64, at 122-53; see generally BARRY NAUGHTON, GROWING OUT OF THE PLAN:
CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM, 1978-1993 (1995). For a discussion of the Chinese reforms
see Yuan Zheng Cao et al., Chinese Economic Reforms: Past Successes and Future Chal-
lenges, in ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION: COMPARING ASIA AND EASTERN EUROPE (Wing Thye
Woo et al. eds., 1997).
66. LIEBERTHAL, supra note 64, at 127.
67. Id.
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acteristics has produced some troublesome tensions and contradictions.
For one thing, "[t]he pervasive involvement of government in the economy
is matched by the relatively weak record in institutionalizing some of the
key roles that government needs to play in a market economy," thereby
opening the door to corrupt practices.68 "Official entrepreneurship" has
been pervasive,69 and "[t]he loss of financial control over SOEs [State-
owned enterprises] by the branch ministries represents de facto privatiza-
tion of SOE income streams" by enterprise managers and "asset-stripping"
totaling "about 50 billion yuan [annually] since the early 1980S."70 "The
corruption of those in power, combined with the blatant materialism that
the reformers have nurtured, sap the moral underpinnings of state
power."71
Mayfair Yang has observed how the Party, in apparent recognition of
the challenge to its legitimacy, has tended "to portray guanxixue only in
terms of official corruption and bribery."72 She cites a 1981 public speech
'by Zhao Ziyang criticizing officials in charge of economic activities for tak-
ing advantage of opportunities provided by the reforms to use their office
as a means for extracting benefits for themselves:
As a result of the ten years of internal disruption, our fine tradition has been
seriously damaged. Old practices and ways of thinking left over from the old
society have been resurrected. Recently in the economic sphere of our soci-
68. Barry Naughton, The Pattern and Logic of China's Economic Reform, in CHINA'S
ECONOMIC FuTuRE: CHALLENGES TO U.S. POLICY 3 (Joint Econ. Comm., U.S. Congress, ed.
1997) ("Weak institutionalization and pervasive government involvement in business
open the door to corrupt practices.").
69. Kenneth Lieberthal, Politics and Economics in China, in CHINKS ECONOMIC
FUTuRE, supra note 68, at 13. Lieberthal has described the phenomenon as follows:
Government and communist party cadres take advantage of their official posi-
tions to demand bribes, to place their relatives in lucrative positions, to impose
illegal "fees" for performing regular duties such as issuing licenses and approv-
als, and to engage in other forms of corrupt behavior. Corruption has reached a
level that has provoked wide-spread cynicism and anger among China's citizens,
thus weakening the ties that bind the polity together even as it strengthens the
resolve of many officials to maintain the current system largely intact.
Id. at 13. A recent study of foreign enterprises doing business in China defines corrup-
tion as a generic term for a weak array of issues dealt with by foreign enterprises in
developing markets such as China:
It might encompass bribery, theft, bid rigging, intellectual piracy, and coercive
collection engaged in by private parties, public officials at any level, or expatri-
ate businessmen and firms. The universe of the possibly corrupt ranges from the
clearly corrupt (bribes to get customs duties lowered) to the likely corrupt ("rep
fees" to facilitate large government procurement contracts) to the murky (gift
giving and extravagant entertainment for official customers or children of high-
level officials).
DANIEL H. ROSEN, BEHIND THE OPEN DOOR: FOREIGN ENTERPRISES IN THE CHINESE MARKmE-
PLACE 218 (1999) (emphasis in original).
70. Wing Thye Woo, Crises and Institutional Evolution in China's Industrial Sector, in
CHINA'S ECONOMIC FuTuRE, supra note 68, at 165.
71. Lieberthal, supra note 69, at 13 ("Because in China the state has always been
expected to provide the moral framework for society as a whole, the failure to articulate
and sustain a moral rationale for the current system is potentially a very serious
matter.").
72. YANG, supra note 56, at 62.
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ety have appeared the abominable phenomena of banqueting and gift-giving,
pulling guanxi, seeking "commissions," going through the back door, and
engaging in extravagant and wasteful behavior. In a few economic units,
economic management organizations and their responsible cadres are not
only so familiar with this behavior that they do not bother to put a stop to it,
but even go along with it and sink into the mire. This sort of phenomenon
has already seriously corrupted the ranks of our cadres and workers and has
given rise to intense discontent amongst the masses.73
Yang finds representative value in this passage "in that it shows how in
official discourse, the art of guanxi is predominately understood as a nega-
tive phenomenon, the corruption of officialdom." 74
The Chinese reforms, however, are a dynamic, ongoing process, and
they have produced "an impressive number of laws and regulations aimed
at supporting the transition towards a socialist market economy" in the
areas of "contract, property and foreign business relations."75 The fact that
their enforcement has been spotty7 6 should come as no surprise in view of
the Confucian tradition's non-legalist foundations and Maoist antipathy
toward law in its quest to reduce bureaucratism and harness the energy of
permanent revolutionary fervor. By 1995, however, Douglas Guthrie pro-
duced evidence to support the argument that "powerful economic actors
often pay more and more attention to the laws, rules and regulations that
are part of the emerging rational-legal system which is being constructed by
the Chinese state."7 7 This view represents a shift from the arguments a few
years earlier that "social networks and the use of these networks to
exchange gifts and favors (guanxi xue or guanxi practice) are increasing in
importance in China's transition."78
[G]uanxi is often embraced as an important part of business in a market
economy, a clear distinction is made between "establishing good business
relations" (gaohao shangye guanxi) and using social relations to take care of
procedures (kao guanxi xue ban shouxu) in economic and political situa-
tions. The latter, which is considered corrupt-"backdoor" (houmen) prac-
tice-is increasingly taboo for many large urban industrial firms. 79
As a result, "[many managers of large industrial organizations increasingly
view guanxi practice as unnecessary and dangerous in light of new regula-
73. Id.
74. Id. Indeed, analysis of corruption in China has generated a number of book-
length studies: T. WING Lo, CORRUPTION AND POLITICS IN HONG KONG AND CHINA (1993);
TING GONG, THE POLITICS oF CORRUPTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA-AN ANALYSIS OF POL-
icy OUTCOMES (1994); JULIA KwONG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION IN CHINA
(1997).
75. Pitman B. Potter, Law Reform and China's Emerging Market Economy, in CHINA's
ECONOMIC FUTURE, supra note 68, at 221.
76. See id. (stating that "enforcement remains a serious problem").
77. Douglas Guthrie, The Declining Significance of Guanxi in China's Economic Transi-
tion, CHINA Q., June 1998, at 255.
78. Id. In his first footnote, Guthrie cites a number of studies suggesting the
increased importance of guanxi in the transition. Id. at 254-55 n.1.
79. Id. at 255.
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tions and prohibitions against such approaches to official procedures."80
Evidence in another study conducted contemporaneously with that
supporting Guthrie's conclusions suggests a continued predominance of
act utilitarianism over rule utilitarianism in China, compared to South
Korea, Mexico, and the United States.81 Even that study, however, suggests
links between managers' ethical responses and varying stages of their
countries' cultural and economic development. The study suggests that
"the strong capitalist economy that has emerged recently in South Korea is
contributing to the development of an ethical decision pattern similar to
that of the Western countries, albeit somewhat restrained by the traditions
of Eastern cultural values."8 2 The study attributes the unusual prominence
of act utilitarianism and weakness of rule utilitarianism in China to "the
current transition from central planning to a market economy," noting that
"[f]or many people in China, this process has undermined traditional cul-
tural values as well as those of communist socialism."8 3 The study also
observes the need for "[m]ore extrinsic analysis of the process of values
change and its implications for business ethics in China... with particular
attention to the effects of temporal change."84 An earlier "snapshot" general-
ization about acceptable ethical behavior in China may or may not lead to
appropriate conclusions concerning conduct in subsequent transactions.
IV. Back to Globalization
Having first discussed broad issues of globalization earlier in this paper
and, second, conducted a more microscopic examination of the impact of
economic reform on Chinese conduct, let us come full circle and return to
the impact of globalization. The accelerating rate of globalization has been
accompanied by heightened awareness of differing attributes and values
with regard to bribery, corruption and business ethics in general. In this
connection, globalization has sparked a debate over whether extraterrito-
rial restrictions on bribery are a viable and desirable international policy
for the 21st century, or whether they represent a new-form of cultural
imperialism. A recent Colloquy in the Yale Journal of International Law
posed two sides of the issue.85 Steve Salbu suggests that, while fostering
community in the "global village" is a desirable goal, pluralistic attitudes
80. Id. Given the ongoing evolution of China's transition, Guthrie does not find it
surprising that "changes surrounding guanxi Vary with a firm's position in the state
administrative hierarchy; attitudes toward guanxi also vary with a number of organiza-
tional factors ranging from the background of the firm's general manager to whether or
not the organization has a joint venture with a foreign company." Id. at 255-56.
81. See John M. Etheredge & Carolyn B. Erdener, Ethical Decision Patterns in Four
Countries: Contrasting Theoretical Perspectives, in INTmRNA-ONAL Busm .Ss ETHiCS: CHAL-
LENGES AND APPROACHES 61 (Georges Enderle ed., 1999) ("[N]on-consequentialist orien-
tation, emphasizing human rights and individual justice, is also relatively important [for
China], although at a much lower level than in the two Western societies.").
82. Id.
83. Id. at 62.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. See Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evocation
of the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 223 (1999).
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across the globe make assessing motives across a cultural divide very diffi-
cult, with significant risk of ethnocentrism.8 6 Philip Nichols takes the con-
trasting position that host country regulation and voluntary codes have not
been able to completely reach transnational bribery, which is seen as
harmful and increasing; home country regulation is therefore required for
effective control.87
It is important to note that this debate began to emerge when only one
country, the United States, had adopted anything like the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act 88 ("FCPA'). If not cultural imperialism, extraterritorial
enforcement of the FCPA could at the very least be criticized as an exercise
of American hegemony. However, hegemonic influence is not always nec-
essarily evil, or even bad. Lea Brilmayer suggests that consent can be
obtained for the exercise of post-Cold War American hegemony as a form
of international governance and demonstrates how further justification for
hegemonic governance can be derived from basic universal norms of
human rights.89 One might see a parallel here to Donaldson and Dunfee's
"hypernorms," universal principles by which authentic ethical norms of
diverse communities are bounded. 90 Hegemonic stability theory requires
the existence of a hegemon for the creation and maintenance of open trade
regimes.91
It is also important to note that the FCPA is no longer solitary or
unique. Global momentum has grown in recent years toward the develop-
ment and implementation of legal regimes to deter corrupt practices; these
efforts to deter corrupt practices in the conduct of international business
86. See id. at 226.
87. See Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization
and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 259 (1999). The Winter 1999 Yale Colloquy fur-
ther develops the debate embodied in the authors' articles in the Spring 1999 Michigan
Journal of International Law. See Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act As a
Threat to Global Harmony, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 419-49 (1999); Philip N. Nichols, Are
Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and Desirable International Policy Goal
Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Century?: Increasing Global Security By
Controlling Transnational Bribery, 20 MICH. J. INr'L L. 451-76 (1999).
88. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a,
78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff) (amending scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78kk
(1976)).
89. See LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN HEGEMONY: POLITICAL MORALITY IN A ONE-SUPER-
PowER WORLD 66-90, 91-111, 112-40 (1994) (discussing at length contemporaneous
consent, ex ante consent, and hypothetical consent). Brilmayer identifies three bases for
consent: (1) contemporaneous consent, whereby subordinate states have acquiesced. In
this way, hegemonic power is obtained by persuasion and inducement, not by coercion
and threats, see id. at 66-90; (2) ex ante consent, whereby hegemony is exercised in
accordance with international law, see id. at 91-111; (3) hypothetical consent, which
may result when a hegemon facilitates the provision of public goods that would not be
produced in its absence, see id. at 112-40.
90. See THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND: A SocIAL CON-
TRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS 49-81 (1999).
91. See Anders Ahnlid, Comparing GATT and GATS: Regime Creation Under and After
Hegemony, 3 REv. INT'L POL. ECON. 65 (1996) ("According to hegemonic stability theory
the creation and maintenance of open trade regimes require the existence of a
hegemon.").
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have taken place in both international and domestic fora.92 Clearly, the
pace of harmonization of domestic institutions, policies and practices
addressing bribery and corruption across trading nations is beginning to
quicken as globalization and a freer trade environment continue. If the
GATT disciplines of Most Favored Nation and National Treatment can be
extended to services,93 it may be logical to employ the World Trade Organi-
zation's enhanced enforcement mechanism to address transnational brib-
ery as well.9 4
With respect to China, WTO membership may be a more effective
deterrent to official corruption and bribe-taking than the Communist
Party's much publicized campaigns against it.95 Kenneth Lieberthal has
pointed out how China's corruption "thrives on the fact that the Chinese
system is currently semireformed, neither subject to a disciplined plan nor
driven primarily by the market via activities constrained by law."96 Most
commentators believe that China's accession to the WTO will reinforce
92. See Stuart H. Deming, Foreign Corrupt Practices, 33 INT'L LAW. 507 (1999).
The most noteworthy international developments relate to the implementation
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions ... and the Council of Europe's newly adopted Criminal Law Con-
vention on Corruption.... Though less dramatic, there continued to be devel-
opments with the ratification and implementation of the Organization of
American States Inter-American Convention Against Corruption... and the
European Union's Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Offi-
cials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of the Euro-
pean Convention.
Id. The OECD Antibribery Convention, in particular, has attracted the attention of the
U.S. Commerce Department, which filed its First Annual Report to Congress on the
convention in July 1999. See DOC Trade Compliance Ctr., Addressing the Challenges of
International Bribery and Fair Competition (July 1999) <http://www.mac.doc.gov/TCC/
BRIBERY/oecdreport/index.html>.
93. See Bernard Hoekman, Services and Intellectual Property Rights, in THE NEw GA=-.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 99 (Susan M. Collins & Barry P. Bosworth, eds.
1994).
94. A good case for this position is articulated in Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Trans-
national Bribery Through the World Trade Organization, 28 LAw & POL'Y Ir'L Bus. 310
(1997).
95. In the anticorruption campaign of 1990-92, for example, "707,000 cases were
investigated, and more than 600,000 Party cadres were punished, including 16,005 cad-
res above the rank of county magistrate." SHIPING ZHENG, PARTY VS. STATE IN PosT-1949
CHINA THE INSnIUTONAL DILEMMA 208 (1997). "Although serious warnings against cor-
ruption are reported almost every day in the official newspaper, corruption in China
seems to have continued unabated. The reason is that the widespread and epidemic
official corruption in China is structural rather than personal." Id. at 209. Kenneth
Lieberthal explains the phenomenon as follows:
Corruption is a function of both opportunity and lack of restraint. The
restraints on such activities have eroded as the guiding ideology of the country
has shifted from one of social purification to one of unvarnished pursuit of
income. Essentially, the reformers have created a situation in which a rising
standard of living provides the political underpinning of the regime....
The economic reform effort has thus led to deeply rooted corruption of the
political system.
LIEBERTHAL, supra note 64, at 268-69.
96. Id. at 269.
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domestic reform. 97 The market opening commitments China has made
will force even the SOEs to adhere more closely to market forces. All Chi-
nese enterprises will have to upgrade and ensure that their products meet
global standards.98 Not only higher quality products but also "financial
systems that operate in accordance with international practices and a cor-
porate culture open to outside influences" will be the key ingredients for
competitive success in such an environment.99
Conclusion
The impact of globalization on Asian development, and the case of China's
economic reform experience in particular, initially appear to give a mixed
message about the effectiveness of extraterritorial restrictions on bribery.
Economic development has flourished in East and Southeast Asia since
World War II in a business and cultural environment that is markedly dif-
ferent from that prevailing in the West. The Asian values debate suggested
alternative routes to growth with due consideration for local customs and
belief systems. These factors must not be ignored in determining what con-
stitutes ethical conduct. C.K. Prahalad and Kenneth Lieberthal have
demonstrated that, while multinationals will change life in big emerging
markets, the opposite is also true:
Many corporations ... are beginning to see that the opportunity that big
emerging markets represent will demand a new way of thinking. Success
will require more than simply developing greater cultural sensitivity. The
more we understand the nature of these markets, the more we believe that
multinationals will have to rethink and reconfigure every element of their
business models. 10 0
However, the region's rapid development can also be attributed to
global phenomena and how effectively it has adapted to dispersed manu-
facturing systems. 10 1 Following chronologically upon state-directed poli-
97. See, e.g., Joseph Fewsmith, China and the WTO: The Politics Behind the Agreement
10 NBR ANA.Ysis 23 (1999) <http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/voll0no5/
essay2.html>. For additional support, as well as an analysis of the WTO's impact on
Chinese politics, see Joseph Fewsmith, The Impact of WTO/PNTR on Chinese Politics, 11
NBR ANALYsis 19-26 (2000) <http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/volllno2/
essay2.html>.
98. See Yan Zi, Global Standards Set for Firms, CHINA Bus. WLY., Apr. 30, 2000, at 8
<http://www.chinadaily.net/bw/history/2000/04/b8-1stan.430.html>.
99. Id.
100. C.K. Prahalad & Kenneth Lieberthal, The End of Corporate Imperialism, HAuv.
Bus. Rav., July-Aug. 1998, at 70. Their analysis focuses on the big emerging markets of
China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil. See id. at 69. Another study focusing specifically
on China concluded that foreign joint-venture policies and practices "tend to reflect the
parent company's corporate culture and strategic imperatives, home-country cultural
beliefs and social values, and CEO philosophies," but that "success in the PRC often
depends on a certain degree of adaptation to Chinese conditions and practices." John Z.
Yang et al., When MNCs Come to China, Who Changes Whom?, CHINA Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr.
1999, at 16.
101. SeeJoan Magretta, Fast, Global, and Entrepreneurial: Supply Chain Management,
Hong Kong Style, HARv. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 105.
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cies of import substitution and export promotion, coupled with promotion
of foreign direct investment and high domestic savings rates,' 0 2 develop-
ment must now proceed in an environment of restructured global competi-
tion in which companies must "focus on their core activities and outsource
the rest."'1 3 This evolution necessitates increased integration into global
systems; and with that will come the need to adhere to the rules of those
systems. Over time, it may be that problems of extraterritorial enforcement
of restrictions against bribery will diminish as harmonized regulations
emerge to supplant them. The trick will be to ensure the fairness of the
process by which such rules evolve, advancing basic principles of eco-
nomic efficiency while preserving the richness of diversity and cultural
difference that make international business so endlessly fascinating.
102. See THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE, supra note 33; see generally CHALMERSJoHNSON, MITI
AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE (1982); ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKEr: ECONOMIC
THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1990). The
Asian development model has by now become a very familiar one.
103. Magretta, supra note 101, at 103. Robert Reich explains the phenomenon as
follows:
Once upon a time, products had distinct national identities. Regardless of how
many international borders they crossed, their country of origin... was never in
doubt. Products were manufactured in one place because economies of scale
necessitated a central location.
But in the emerging high-value economy, quantities can be produced effi-
ciently in many different locations and combined in all sorts of ways to serve
customer needs in many places ....
What's traded between nations is less often finished goods than specialized
research, design, fabrication, management, marketing, advertising, consulting,
financial and legal services, as well as components and materials.
Robert Reich, The Myth of 'Made in the U.S.A.', WALL ST. J., July 5, 1991, at A6.

